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FeatureAfter 34 years, China softens its one-child policy, responding to its dramatically 
altered circumstances and new demographic challenges. Michael Gross reports. 
Where next for China’s population policy? Crowded China: Following the doubling of its population under chairman Mao Zedong, China 
introduced the one-child policy to stop the population explosion. (Photo: © Sophie Caron.)The world in 1979, half-way between 
Hiroshima and today, is already 
beginning to look exotic in the rear-
view mirror. Jimmy Carter was still 
the US president, Margaret Thatcher 
became the UK’s prime minister, while 
Leonid Brezhnev still presided over 
the Soviet Union. In February 1979, 
the Islamic revolution in Iran ended a 
monarchy that had just celebrated its 
2500th anniversary seven years earlier, 
and at the end of the year the Soviet 
Union intervened in the civil war in 
Afghanistan, which led to the boycott 
of the 1980 Olympics at Moscow by 
many western countries. 
Meanwhile, the western world 
kept wondering what direction China 
might take after the death of its 
revolutionary leader Mao Zedong 
in September 1976. The trial of the 
Gang of Four and the power struggle 
between communist hardliners led 
by Hua Guofeng and more market-
oriented reformers under Deng 
Xiaoping left the outside world 
guessing. At the beginning of 1979, 
the Carter administration recognised 
the People’s Republic of China, 
rather than Taiwan, as the legitimate 
representation of China, and Deng 
Xiaoping’s faction was beginning to 
steer the country towards a more 
capitalist future. 
At that point, China’s economy was 
still dominated by agriculture. Around 
80% of workers were employed 
in this sector, which still relied on 
manual work and used every scrap 
of land available. The population was 
approaching the one-billion mark and 
growing steadily. It had nearly doubled 
in the previous 30 years since the 
beginnings of the People’s Republic. 
As the country had neither spare land 
to farm nor established industries to 
produce goods for export, population 
growth became a threat to food 
security, and the authorities were 
beginning to try out various soft 
and not quite so soft measures to 
curb the fertility rates. Young people 
were encouraged to delay their 
procreation, and women who had two 
children already were threatened with sterilisation should they fall pregnant 
again. 
In 1979 the Chinese leadership 
announced a new drastic set of rules 
that became known as the one-child 
policy. It is based on the household 
registration system (hukou), which 
differentiates between urban and rural 
populations. Residents of urban areas 
were strictly allowed only one child. 
Exceptions for rural areas allowed a 
second child if the firstborn was a girl, 
thus giving in to a culturally engrained 
preference for sons, which also led to 
selective abortions and infanticides, 
shifting the gender balance 
significantly. 
Violation of the rules could be 
punished with fines amounting 
to several annual salaries of the 
household concerned, but the 
strictness of implementation varied by 
region. 
Little emperors
Now, after a generation has grown 
up under the one-child policy, 
the population has grown to 1.35 
billion, which is an increase of only 
35% compared to a doubling in the previous 34 years. The total fertility 
rate, i.e. the number of children a 
woman has on average over her 
lifetime, was estimated at 1.55 
children per woman (all current 
population data are 2013 estimates 
from the CIA World Factbook, 
accessed 16.1.2014: https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html). Some praise 
the policy for avoiding 300 to 400 
million births, while others criticise it 
as a violation of human rights. 
Meanwhile, China has become the 
world’s second largest economy, 
with its sights set on overtaking 
the US. It has landed a rover on the 
moon and set up a world leading 
genomics centre. Its new leadership 
under president Xi Jinping, who took 
office in March 2013, is readjusting 
the country’s ambitions and outlook, 
defining a “Chinese dream” and 
also softening the population 
policy. The power of the communist 
party remains firm, however, and 
dissidents like the artist Ai Wei Wei 
and the former law professor Zhang 
Xuezhong are feeling its force. Since 
November 2013, disputes with Japan 
over islands in the Pacific have 
erupted in name-calling and displays 
of military strength. Again, as in 1979, 
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Growing old: Due to the drastic and sudden reduction in fertility rates, the age distribution in 
China is changing much faster than in western countries, where fertility declined more slowly. 
(Photo: © Steve Evans (http://babasteve.blogspot.co.uk/).)the world is wondering what China 
will do next. 
The one-child policy, although 
successful in averting an imminent 
population disaster, has burdened 
China with two major demographic 
side-effects, namely the increasing 
prevalence of people who grew up as 
their parents’ only child, and the rapid 
inversion of the age pyramid. 
Lisa Cameron from Monash 
University in Clayton, Australia, 
and colleagues have studied the 
psychological impact of the policy 
by testing individuals from two 
cohorts born before the policy (in 
1975 and 1978) in comparison to 
two cohorts born under the policy 
(in 1980 or 1983). The authors 
emphasize that they are not testing 
for the effects of being an only 
child – some of those born before 
1979 had no siblings, while some 
of those from the two later cohorts 
did. Rather, they are testing for the 
impact of the wider societal context, 
where being an only child becomes 
the norm (Science (2013) 339, 
953–957).
The single children born under 
the one-child policy have become 
nicknamed ‘little emperors’, as it is 
often assumed that they have been 
spoilt by the attention of their parents 
being focused on them and that they 
have failed to acquire certain social 
and co-operative behaviours due to 
the lack of siblings. Testing a total of 421 individuals 
born either side of 1979 in Beijing, 
where the policy was strictly enforced, 
Cameron and colleagues applied 
established economic experiments 
for traits including altruism, trust, 
trustworthiness, willingness to take 
risks, and competitiveness. For 
instance, in the risk game, participants 
are given a sum of money, of which 
they can choose any amount to invest 
in a venture that may with equal 
probability triple their investment or 
wipe it out completely. The percentage 
of the initial fund they are willing to 
invest is recorded as a measure of 
their attitude towards risk. 
On all these parameters, the cohorts 
born after the introduction of the 
one-child policy scored significantly 
lower than those born before. The 
‘little emperors’ thus emerged as 
less altruistic, less trusting, less 
trustworthy, more risk-averse and less 
competitive than the generations born 
before 1979. As there were two age 
cohorts on either side of the divide, the 
authors could also control for effects 
of age. In further studies conducted 
with standard questionnaires, the 
post-1979 cohorts also scored higher 
on neuroticism and lower on optimism 
and conscientiousness than the older 
groups. 
The birth cohorts tested in this study 
still have extended families relatively 
unaffected by the policy, as their 
parents still have siblings. The average number of cousins is only slightly 
reduced from 7.4 to 7.0 between the 
two groups compared. One generation 
down the line, as the children of the 
one-child policy become parents 
themselves, this support system is set 
to disappear. The authors conclude: 
“Under such circumstances, we would 
expect that the policy’s effect would, if 
anything, be magnified.” 
The softening of the policy that 
has officially been sanctioned last 
December may alleviate its impact on 
extended families, as it allows couples 
a second child if one of them was an 
only child. Xin Meng, a co-author of 
the little emperors study, suggests 
that, while the policy change won’t 
affect the rural majority, some of 
the urban population may take the 
opportunity: “based on our own data, 
those who grew up as a single child 
because of the one-child policy are  
30 per cent more likely to want to 
have more children keeping everything 
else constant.” This additional 
exception may also help to avoid 
that the first generation to be allowed 
only one child will also be limited to 
one grandchild, which leads us to the 
second demographic problem. 
Who will care for the elderly? 
Due to the one-child policy, China 
is facing the same demographic 
problem as Japan and many European 
countries. The drop of fertility rates 
below the replacement level of 
just over two children per woman 
combined with rising life expectancy 
means that the size of the retirement 
age population grows rapidly in 
relation to the working age population. 
In European countries, this 
demographic change happened 
gradually, drawn out over the six 
decades since the post-war baby 
boom. In China, it only took two 
decades. According to 2013 figures, 
9.4% of the population are now over 
65. In 30 years, when the first children 
of the one-child-policy reach that 
age, this share could be several times 
higher. 
The calculation is simple — for 
every 65-year-old couple, there will 
be only 1.5 children aged around 40, 
and only 1.125 teenage grandchildren. 
Depending on future shifts to the 
average life expectancy (currently 
standing at 75 years overall, 77 for 
women, 73 for men), the age group 
over 65 could easily exceed one 
third of the population. This dramatic 
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Young Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa remains the last bastion of high fertility rates. (Photo: 
© Steve Evans (http://babasteve.blogspot.co.uk/).)change comes with multiple economic 
problems. The financing of pensions 
will put an excessive burden on the 
shrinking population of working age, 
threatening the country’s seemingly 
unstoppable economic growth. 
Care for a growing elderly 
population with chronic diseases, 
disability, or dementia will become a 
major challenge. Already, only a very 
small percentage of the elderly find 
places in nursing homes, and many 
rely on family members for their care. 
After two generations of one-child 
policy, however, a single grandchild 
may have to take responsibility for four 
grandparents at the time when they 
would like to start their own family. 
These considerations may also be 
playing a part in the gradual softening 
of the one-child policy. Maybe the 
new government is trying to slowly 
steer the fertility rate a bit closer to the 
replacement level, which would allow 
them to manage the population as a 
steady-state system. 
At the same time, the government 
could also gain support from those 
people who still resent the state’s 
intervention in their family planning. 
Commenting on the recent case of 
the film director Zhang Yimou, who 
was fined for having three children, 
Yuan Ren stated in an opinion piece 
published online by the Guardian 
that “the one-child-policy […] is in 
fact an affront to traditional beliefs. 
While economic growth in China has 
manifested in an improved quality 
of life and a ravaging consumerist 
culture, couples and grandparents 
look to find true meaning in the bliss 
of a different prosperity: the children of 
the next generation.”
One final demographic problem 
is the product of the collision of the 
policy with the traditional preference 
of male offspring. By a combination 
of selective abortion and infanticide, 
parents have raised the gender 
ratio to a staggering 1.15:1 (CIA 
Factbook – other sources even cite 
1.18). The natural ratio is 1.07, as 
nature likes to produce a few spares, 
probably accounting for fights and 
general recklessness in the male of the 
species. So for every 100 boys born, 
the number of girls is being reduced  
by 6.6 in one way or another. Multiply 
that with 16 million births per year, 
and you have 528,000 females missing 
every year, not to mention a similar 
number of males who will be frustrated 
in their search for a wife. Lessons for the world?
Since the one-child policy 
was introduced in 1979, the 
population explosion has slowed 
down significantly, both in 
China and globally. In the 1970s, 
environmentalists like Paul Ehrlich 
predicted global disasters based on 
overpopulation. By now, we have 
become hardened to this outlook, 
as population is only one of around 
a dozen horsemen of our coming 
apocalypse (Curr. Biol. (2013), 23, 
R1017–R1020). 
Other problems, particularly climate 
change, but also the ecological 
footprint of individuals in wealthier 
countries, as well as the loss of 
biodiversity and habitat, are taking 
centre stage. China’s population 
control has worked so well that it 
can now be loosened, and its total 
population is expected to peak around 
2030, at just under 1.4 billion (UN 
estimates from 2010). 
In the rest of the world, a list of 
countries ranked by total fertility rate 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
sovereign_states_and_dependent_
territories_by_fertility_rate) reveals  
that there are only very few hotspots 
of unsustainable human reproduction 
left around the globe. Large parts  
of sub-Saharan Africa maintain  
high total fertility rates, with Niger  
leading the field with just over 7 
births per woman, followed by Mali 
with 6.25. However, these rates are 
counterbalanced by high mortalities, and experts have argued that a 
reduction in child mortality, combined 
with economic development, would 
reduce these rates, as women often 
factor the expected losses into 
their family planning. Access to 
contraception and women’s rights 
to control their own fertility are also 
issues that still need to be addressed 
in some parts of the world. 
Outside Africa, only Afghanistan and 
East Timor have a fertility rate higher 
than four, and only a few countries fall 
in the range of three to four children 
per woman. Like China, India has 
also made progress in controlling 
its population growth. Its population 
stands at 1.22 billion, with a total 
fertility rate around 2.55 — although 
India also has a suspicious shortage  
of female births, with a sex ratio at  
birth of 1.12:1. At current trends,  
world population may level off at  
a headcount somewhere near  
10 billion by the end of the century (UN 
projection from 2010).  
Environmentalists including Paul 
Ehrlich are still calling to further slow 
its growth and humanely reduce the 
peak height of global population. 
However, the example of China also 
suggests that only an authoritarian 
regime could enforce such drastic 
deviation from what a majority of 
people want for their family life. 
Thus, barring catastrophes, the 
best hope for tighter population 
control is probably that development 
will naturally reduce the family size 
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China’s dream: In economic terms, China 
has been spectacularly successful in the last 
decades, but will demographic challenges 
end its rise? (Photo: Stephen Codrington.)
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What turned you on to biology in the 
first place? Music led me to science. 
When I started college, I didn’t know 
what I wanted to ‘be when I grew up’. 
Frankly, I wasn’t very excited about 
going to college in general, but I 
enrolled at the University of Texas (UT 
Austin) in an honors liberal arts program 
(called Plan II) that introduced me to an 
intellectual group of people (mostly in 
the humanities, but some scientists as 
well). I discovered rapidly that college 
was NOT merely a continuation of high 
school and that I loved the intellectual 
environment. However, ‘liberal arts’ 
wasn’t an attractive career aspiration. 
I’ve always liked challenges and since 
everyone else seemed to want to be a 
physician and it was one of the most 
competitive majors, I declared as a pre-
med along with the liberal arts major.
However, in my first year at UT, I took 
a music appreciation course and fell 
in love with classical music. I attended 
every concert that I could get into and 
became enamored with the idea of 
becoming the conductor of a major 
symphony orchestra (it remains a fond 
pipe dream!). I began piano and violin 
classes, as well as theory courses for 
the music majors. However, I had never 
had music lessons as a child and it 
was too late for me at the age of 19 to 
develop the ‘ear’. Alas! An unfulfilled 
dream.
Q & A
Nevertheless, it was music that 
led me to science. I’ve always had a 
passable singing voice and since I had 
never learned any other instrument, 
developing voice as my ‘instrument’ 
was the only logical course of action. 
However, voice lessons cost money 
and my widow mother was barely able 
to afford my tuition/fees/food. There 
was nothing left over for something 
as frivolous as voice lessons. So, I 
needed to get a job to earn money for 
voice lessons. There was a biology 
professor whose class I had enjoyed 
in my freshman year and I went to ask 
that professor for a job. His name is 
Michael Menaker (now a professor 
at the University of Virginia) and he 
was the first person who had a really 
profound impact on my decision to 
become a scientist. When I asked him 
for a job, he looked at me sideways (he 
knew who I was because I had asked 
a lot of questions in class) and said, 
“Yeah . . . I’ve got a job for you” and he 
put me to work in the lab. That began a 
working relationship with Dr. Menaker 
that would last the remainder of my 
undergraduate career.
I earned the money to take voice 
lessons, but more importantly I learned 
that I liked scientific research. I’ve 
always felt that research was like 
playing a chess game against nature. 
I resonate with a quote from Sir Peter 
Medawar that “the art of research 
is that of making (an apparently 
intractable) problem soluble by finding 
out (experimental) ways of getting 
at it — soft underbellies and the 
like”. Despite gravitating to research, 
however, I wasn’t very successful at 
it as an undergraduate (or for most everywhere, as it has done across 
Europe. Even in France, which 
competes with Ireland for the title of 
the EU’s most fertile member state,  
the total fertility rate dropped below 
reproduction level last year. Other 
European countries, including 
Germany, are most worried about how 
to raise it to get closer to a steady 
state and save the provisions for the 
elderly from collapse. 
The threat of an exponential 
‘explosion’ of world population 
appears to have subsided. New 
demographic challenges have replaced 
it, from the age distribution and gender 
balance through to migration between 
countries and also within countries. 
For instance, the rapid growth of 
China’s economy has depended on 
an unprecedented migration of around 
200 million people from rural areas to 
the cities, as Xin Meng explains in a 
recent book review (Science (2014) 
343, 138–139). The next challenge 
for governments in China, India, and 
other populous countries is now to 
fine-tune the development and mobility 
of their populations in ways that are 
both sustainable and acceptable to the 
people. 
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